NEHEN's November program, in its sixteenth year at Foley Hoag Seaport, took up a question: "What is a board actually for, and when does it earn its keep?" Rick Williams moderated the session, with panelists drawn from a public company chair, a serial biotech founder, a healthcare venture investor, and a med tech operator. The notes below are drawn from the discussion.
The best time to build a board is before you need one
Rick Williams opened on Silicon Valley Bank, because the lesson travels. The bank's balance sheet held most of its assets in bonds. Anyone paying attention could see what a rate move would do to that collateral, and the rate move came. Management did not act. The board did not press. The regulators eventually took the firm. For Williams, the episode was a straightforward failure of board diligence, and his framing of the morning followed. The worst time to ask whether the right board is in place is the moment the company is raising capital, contemplating a sale, or managing a crisis. Strong boards are built before they are tested.
Treated well, he argued that the board is one of the company's least used assets. It brings experience, networks and credibility the senior team does not have on its own, and, in the right configuration, it functions as both the manager of the chief executive and the coach. That dual role is where most of the value sits, and the one most often lost when founders treat the board as a quarterly box to tick.
The worst time to ask whether you have the right board in place is when you're facing a crisis, raising capital, or contemplating a sale. Build strong boards before you test them. Rick Williams · Managing Director, Rick Williams Leadership
The board governs. It does not run the company.
Cheryl Blanchard's twelve years at Zimmer Biomet, and later as chief executive of Microchips Biotech and then Anika Therapeutics, show that no single board fits all stages of a company's lifecycle. There are at least three kinds, and each has a different job description. In a public company, the fiduciary duty to public shareholders drives almost everything; process, governance, and legal risk dominate the calendar. In a private company, the board is a smaller working group whose job is to supply the expertise the company lacks: connections, financial oversight, scientific challenge. In a private equity-controlled company, the sponsor hires two or three deep operators as near consultants and runs governance itself, because it owns the company and has an exit strategy and timeline.
The implication is that the first question is not who should be on the board, but where the company sits in its life cycle and who owns it. Everything else, including the committee structure, the refresh cadence and the right chair, follows from that.
Hire the board. Do not inherit it.
Gregory Verdine, whose career building companies from zero to one culminated this June in Parabilis Medicines closing the largest biotech IPO on record, is in the unusual position of having picked every board he has ever sat on. His investors and directors come in acclimated to the idea that the plan will change; the board is populated with people he has worked with before and will work with again. Most founders do not have that luxury. Decide which seats you need before offering any.
Williams' version of the same point, aimed at founders who do not get to populate their own boards from scratch, was blunter. Do a skills matrix before you fill a seat. If every seat on the board looks like the chief executive, you are better off making the decision in a closet by yourself. Diversity of experience, point of view, and discipline is not an HR exercise; it is the whole reason the board exists. And, he added, do not hire your golf buddy.
Diligence who else is at the table. How they treated the chief executives they worked with, and how they played when no one was watching. Mira Sahney · President, IPG Medical
The investor sitting next to you is also on a clock
Josh Phillips told a story about a medical device company that raised a large round from a hedge fund after its venture syndicate had closed. The money looked attractive at the time. The hedge fund partner wanted to pivot the business into consumer products; management, lacking an obvious way to say no to the largest checkwriter in the room, went where the money went. Board meetings became exercises in whipsaw, and neither the medical nor the consumer strategy got anywhere.
Blanchard offered a parallel version from the public market. A venture investor who is still holding a board seat after the initial public offering may have a different view. The board chair can manage that disagreement, but only by naming it. The practical takeaway, from both panelists: diligence the syndicate the way you would diligence the term sheet. Ask what year of the fund the lead is in. Ask how they have behaved on other boards. A tougher term sheet from the right investor is usually the better trade.
The hardest work on the board is self-awareness
Verdine has voluntarily left companies he founded. At Parabilis he decided, as the company moved its first beta catenin inhibitor into the clinic, that what came next needed a chief executive whose instinct was clinical development rather than discovery. He said as much to his board, and the board hired someone else. "You create trust," he said, "by telling your board that it would be a better idea for them to bring on another chief executive." Blanchard described the counterpart in a public company. She stepped in at Anika Therapeutics with a five-year turnaround in mind, built her team, named her successor, and left on that timetable.
The harder case is the director who overstays. Blanchard inherited a board with a member who had held his seat for thirty years. The refresh, she said, is best handled as a process rather than a personality. Establish a skills matrix. Keep to terms. In a public company, cue off the annual proxy; in a private one, borrow the same logic with staggered terms. Then the conversation becomes about where the company is going rather than about whom you are asking to leave.
You want the best pilot sitting in that seat when the ship hits the fan. Cheryl Blanchard, PhD · Executive Chair, Anika Therapeutics
Share the right amount of the right thing
An audience question on Theranos drew the sharpest governance point of the morning. The company was structured so founders held a dominant voting bloc, and investors with no domain expertise in regulated diagnostics provided the money. Boards under those two conditions tend to serve the founder rather than the company. The structural lesson. When founders retain extreme control, and the board lacks the capability to challenge them, oversight becomes a formality.
The practical corollary, from the panel's own meetings, is that the chief executive's job is not to withhold information or dump it. Bring the board problems with a plan attached. "If our clinical trial had a death, we are looking at why, we have a plan, we will report back in fifteen days" is the right frame. "A patient died, what should I do?" is not a board question. Scientific and technical depth belongs in a committee that meets before the board meeting and reports out; the main room is for the handful of decisions the company has to make.
The real board meeting starts a week before the meeting
Williams closed with a structural point the panel all recognized. Boards that work spend their time on two or three strategic questions and almost no time reading slides. That requires pre-work: a deck circulated at least a week ahead, one-on-one calls between the chief executive and each director, and a prewire on the options under consideration. One chief executive Williams works with spends two minutes on the summary slide and the rest of the meeting on the questions the company actually needs help with. Without that discipline, the real meeting slides into the executive session or over lunch. Which is fine, up to a point, and expensive the moment a decision has to be made without the operating team in the room.
A smaller note, for the record. Several in the audience mentioned adding artificial intelligence agents to their own board preparation; one director said a model now reviews the deck for him and surfaces the two or three questions he would have asked by the second read. The panel did not rule on the practice, but nobody in the room was surprised to hear it.







